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Introduction 
 
Energy policy has always been part of the DNA of the European Union (EU) since its inception as a 
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951, and EURATOM in 1957. The focus was  
twofold: On the one hand, the ECSC paved the way for a single coal and steel market and on the 
other, the EURATOM established a nuclear safety framework.1 While the EU is still very much 
focused on maintaining an integrated internal energy market, the scope of energy policy has 
expanded considerably from its market liberalisation origins. It has gradually lent itself to EU 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). This is especially since the EU has become 
increasingly involved in securing access to energy supplies from abroad and corresponding to the 
energy needs of its Member States. In this foreign policy context, energy policy has also obtained a 
coercive character as the EU is not only looking for reliable and sustainable energy partners but also 
for partners which can comply with its regulatory framework. To ensure compliance the EU has 
developed means to enhance its ability to apply rigorous sanctions against both its Member States 
(e.g. for negotiating supply contracts without consulting the EU) as well as third countries (e.g. 
against external partners such as Russia for its activities in Ukraine which undermine EU values).  
 
In face of recent geopolitical threats and vulnerabilities within the EU and the wider European 
region, energy policy in the CFSP context has focused on energy security. Indeed, energy security 
features high on the political agenda of the EU, gradually becoming a political priority for the 
establishment of a resilient Energy Union. Yet ‘Energy security’ is a multidimensional concept 
which can be hard to decipher in legal terms - it relates to security of supply as well as security of 
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demand and it implies different measures to attain these objectives.2 The purpose of this chapter is, 
therefore, to discuss the externalisation and securitisation of the EU’s internal energy market. The 
main thread of the chapter is that EU energy security policy development has become an important 
variable in ensuring EU wider foreign policy objectives. While, in line with the theme of this 
volume we will be focusing on the CFSP liaisons with EU energy policy, the chapter will also 
discuss the securitisation of energy policy from the perspective of the internal market. We will be 
arguing that there is a very strong link between securitisation and competitiveness. As such, we will 
observe the EU’s capacity to externalise its internal market policies both inside and outside the 
contours of CFSP by providing an overview of the existing CFSP framework and insight on the 
extraterritorial application and force of EU competition law to achieve CFSP objectives. 
 
1. Energy Policy as an EU Competence  
 
Since its inception EU energy policy has been characterised by a rather rickety legal competence 
framework, which owes to the lack of an explicit legal basis in the Treaty regarding the adoption of 
legislation in the field. In particular, the EEC Treaty did not provide an express legal basis that 
would enable the EU to adopt energy measures and subsequently push for internal energy market 
liberalisation. What the Treaty provided instead was a host of leges speciales that enabled the EU 
legislature to regulate the Single Market or certain leges generales to pursue supranational 
objectives viz. building an internal energy market; reducing carbon emissions; and setting 
renewable energy and efficiency targets.  
 
Given the above competence patchwork, the EU legislature had to act peripherally if it was to 
legislate on a matter connected to energy. With reference to the leges speciales under the Treaty, the 
provisions on public health and environmental protection proved particularly useful in providing a 
platform for concerted action between the EU and the Member States. For instance, Article 152 EC 
was a supporting competence requiring a high level of human health protection to be ensured 
through cooperation (not harmonisation). Likewise, Article 175 (1) EC, a shared competence on the 
protection of the environment, enabled the Community to adopt legislation aimed at the promotion 
of renewable energy sources and energy efficiency. As mentioned, certain leges generales under the 
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Treaty (specifically a broad interpretation of Articles 95 EC and 308 EC – current Articles 114 
TFEU and 352 TFEU), supplemented the Community with broad implicit legislative competences 
in the energy sector. For example, former Article 95 EC proved to be instrumental to protect the 
consumer, once existing disparities in national product safety rules (e.g. the treatment of foodstuffs 
by ionising radiation) hindering the functioning of the internal market (e.g. the free movement of 
foodstuffs) created conditions of unequal competition. Its contribution was also significant for the 
promotion of renewable energy through a number of related Directives.3 Article 95 EC also formed 
the legal basis for the promulgation of the EU energy legislative packages, which sought to 
harmonise Member State laws.  
 
The above process of harmonisation initiated by the Commission in the late 1980s4 and later on 
accelerated by the first (1996/98)5 , second (2003)6  and third (2009)7  legislative packages, was 
frequently met with resistance by the Member States, ‘who were unwilling to surrender their 
“energy sovereignty” to the Commission.’8 This was especially the case in the early days, due to 
various historical and institutional realities. More specifically, in the devastated from the Second 
Word War Europe, energy was very much tied to national sovereignty, and state-owned, vertically 
integrated energy monopolies were established as the main vehicle to rebuilt the countries’ 
economy. In contrast to the slow progress made in the creation of a single market for energy, 
measures to promote energy security were put in place since the very beginning of European 
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 See Directive 2009/28/EC on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources and amending and 
subsequently repealing Directives 2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC OJ L 140, 5.6.2009, p. 16 
4
 See Completion of the Internal Market in Electricity and Gas (Com (1989)) 332 final and 334 final; COM (1991) 548 
final). 
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 The first legislative package comprised Directives 96/92/EC [2003] OJ L176/37 concerning common rules for the 
internal market in electricity and 98/30/EC [2003] OJ L176/57 on common rules for the internal market in natural gas. 
6
 The second legislative package was enacted in 2003 and enabled new gas and electricity suppliers to enter Member 
States’ markets as well as consumers (industrial consumers from 1 July 2004 and domestic consumers from 1 July 
2007) to choose their own gas and electricity suppliers. It consisted of Directive 2003/54/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003 concerning common rules for internal market in electricity and repealing 
Directive 96/92/EC [2003] OJ L176/37 and Directive 2003/55/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 
June 2003 concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas and repealing Directive 98/30/EC [2003] OJ 
L176/57. 
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 In April 2009, a third legislative package seeking to further liberalise the internal electricity and gas market was 
adopted, amending the second package. The Third Package comprises two Directives and three Regulations: Directive 
2009/72/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal 
market in electricity and repealing Directive 2003/54/EC [2009] OJ L211/55 (Electricity Directive 2009); Directive 
2009/73/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal 
market in natural gas and repealing Directive 2003/55/EC [2009] OJ L211/94 (Gas Directive 2009); Regulation (EC) 
No 714/2009 on conditions for access to network for cross-border exchanges in electricity and repealing Regulation 
(EC) No 1228/2003 [2009] OJ L211/15 (Electricity Regulation 2009); Regulation (EC) 715/2009 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on conditions for access to the network for cross-border exchanges in 
electricity and repealing Regulation (EC) 1775/2005 (Gas Regulation 2009) and Regulation (EC) 713/2009 establishing 
an Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators [2009] OJ L211/1. 
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integration, rendering security of supply the main pillar of a common energy policy.9 This was 
owing to the major oil crises (i.e. Suez Crisis in 1956-1957; OPEC oil crisis 1970), which exposed 
EU’s dependency to varying degrees on energy imports of oil, gas, coal and electricity. This in turn 
triggered efforts to create an EU-wide emergency system, which continues to evolve.10 More recent 
initiatives in the fields of renewables energy11, energy efficiency12 and internal energy market also 
aim at securing energy.  
 
The Treaty of Lisbon, which amended the EC Treaty, resolved the competence conundrum in the 
field of energy. For the first time, ‘energy policy’ features as an area of EU competence under 
Article 4 (2) (i) TFEU while Article 194 TFEU creates a new competence in the field of energy 
which is shared between the EU and the Member States. It states the following: 
 
1. In the context of the establishment and functioning of the internal market and with regard 
for the need to preserve and improve the environment, Union policy on energy shall aim, in 
a spirit of solidarity between Member States, to: 
(a) ensure the functioning of the energy market; 
(b) ensure security of energy supply in the Union; 
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 See Decision 68/416/EEC on minimum stocks of crude oil and petroleum products and Council Directive 73/238/EEC 
of 24.6.1973 on measures to mitigate the effects of difficulties in the supply of crude oil and petroleum products, OJ 
1973, L 228, p.1. 
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 Directive 68/414 of 20.12.1968 about minimum storage requirements for oil and oil products, OJ 1968, L 308, p.14 
was promulgated as a response to the second Suez crisis. The 1968 Directive was subsequently amended by Directives 
72/425/EEC of 19.12.1972, OJ L291/154 and 98/93/EC [OJ L358/100] both of which were later codified by Directive 
2006/67/EC [2006] OJ L217/8. The current legislation in force is contained in Directive 2009/119/EC [2009] OJ 
L265/9. Other measures include Regulation (EEC) No 1055/72 of the Council of 18 May 1972 concerning notification 
of imports of crude oil and natural gas [OJ 1972, L120/3]; Regulation (EEC) No 1056/72 of the Council of 18 May 
1972 on notifying the Commission of investment projects of interest to the Community in the petroleum, natural gas 
and electricity sectors, [OJ L 120/7]; Directive concerning measures to weaken the impact of difficulties of supply with 
oil and oil products, OJ 1973, L228. The Community developed its own emergency system in the light of the oil shocks 
at the end of the 1970s and in the wake of the Iranian revolution and subsequent war with Iraq by adopting two 
decisions: one on the export of crude oil and petroleum products from one Member State to another in the event of 
supply difficulties (Council Decision 77/186/EEC [1977] OJ L61/23, as amended by Decision 79/879/EEC [1979] OJ 
L250/58) and another to cut back consumption of primary energy resources in the case of supply difficulties (Council 
Decision 77/706/EEC [1977] OJ L292/9, implemented by Commission Decision 79/639/EEC [1979] OJ L183/1). 
During the 1970s oil crisis, a limitation of Article 34 regarding free and competitive trade through EU secondary 
legislation was tolerated in the light of security of supply fears, see Council Directive 77/186/EEC [1977] OJ L 61/23 
amended by Council Decision 79/879/EEC [1979] OJ L 270/58; these provisions have since been abolished. 
11
 Proposal for a Directive amending Directive 98/70/EC relating to the quality of petrol and diesel fuels and amending 
Directive 2009/28/EC on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources COM/2012/0595 final - 
2012/0288. 
12
 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament of 6 October 2006: ‘Mobilising 
public and private finance towards global access to climate-friendly, affordable and secure energy services: The Global 
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(c) promote energy efficiency and energy saving and the development of new and renewable 
forms of energy; and 
(d) promote the interconnection of energy networks. 
2. Without prejudice to the application of other provisions of the Treaties, the European 
Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, 
shall establish the measures necessary to achieve the objectives in paragraph 1. Such 
measures shall be adopted after consultation of the Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions. 
Such measures shall not affect a Member State's right to determine the conditions for 
exploiting its energy resources, its choice between different energy sources and the general 
structure of its energy supply, without prejudice to Article 192(2)(c). 
3. By way of derogation from paragraph 2, the Council, acting in accordance with a special 
legislative procedure, shall unanimously and after consulting the European Parliament, 
establish the measures referred to therein when they are primarily of a fiscal nature. 
 
Indeed, like many other TFEU provisions, Article 194 (1) TFEU is not explicit about covering 
exclusively the internal dimension of EU energy policy leaving open questions about employing it 
in order to achieve CFSP objectives. This issue can be somewhat easily resolved by reading Article 
194 TFEU in the light of Article 40 TEU which constitutes a ‘mutual’ non-affectation clause 
triggered when a legal act touches upon both CFSP and non-CFSP fields. Article 40 TEU, 
therefore, protects the integrity of the CFSP from the TFEU as much as it protects the TFEU from 
possible encroachment by the CFSP.13  
 
In the TFEU context, as soon as the Treaty of Lisbon came into force, the EU Institutions made use 
of the new energy competence under Article 194 TFEU in 2010 and adopted a Regulation 
(994/2010) on security of gas supply under Article 194 (2) TFEU requiring Member States to put in 
place internal measures with a view to create an action plan (prevention and emergency).14 Article 
194 (2) TFEU raises particular interest because it reduces the pre-emptive effect of EU legislation 
in the field of energy by confirming that the adoption of measures which: ‘affect a Member State’s 
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 See more about the history of Article 40 TEU: Case C-91/05 Commission v Council (ECOWAS) [2008] ECR I-3651; 
A. Dashwood ‘Article 47 and the Relationship between First and Second Pillar Competences’ in A. Dashwood and M. 
Maresceau (eds), Law and Practice of EU External Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008) p.99  
14
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right to determine the conditions for exploiting its energy resources, its choice between different 
energy sources and the general structure of its energy supply’ is prohibited. Accordingly, EU 
secondary legislation in these areas can only be adopted on the basis of other, non-energy specific 
provisions, such as by unanimous decision of the Council in accordance with Article 192(2)(c) 
TFEU viz. Environment measures significantly affecting a Member State's choice between different 
energy sources and the general structure of its energy supply. Overall, as a result of the Lisbon 
Treaty reforms the EU possesses the constitutional and institutional tools to act collectively on 
behalf of its Member States in the field of energy. Although, this is a welcome development, the EU 
does not yet possess competence in all fields of energy policy and, therefore, often lacks the 
capacity to mobilise resources.15  
 
In the CFSP context, although energy constitutes a strategic foreign policy resource for the EU, in 
terms of legal competence, the Treaty remains silent on energy as an aspect of EU external policy. 
Additionally, there has been no legal transfer of competence to that effect from what is dealt with 
under the CFSP framework to the TFEU as a field of shared competence between the EU and the 
Member States. Although there is no express CFSP-TFEU energy nexus in the Treaty,16 one can 
still identify CFSP links in EU secondary legislation adopted under the new energy competence in 
the TFEU. The above-mentioned Regulation 994/2010 on security of gas supply adopted under 
Article 194 (2) TFEU is a good example. In particular, while the Regulation imposes substantive 
obligations on the Member States, such as to ensure bi-directional capacity of gas infrastructure 
(Article 6 and 7), it also makes reference to ‘energy security’ as an aspect of EU security policy in 
its Preamble:  
 
The Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy... highlights the 
growing reliance on imported energy as a significant additional risk for the Union’s 
security of energy supply and stresses energy security as one of the new challenges for 
security policy. The internal gas market is a central element to increase the security of 
energy supply in the Union, and to reduce the exposure of individual Member States to 
the harmful effects of supply disruptions.17 
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 This is an argument often made by Lindseth viz. that if EU is not prepared to deal with its functional demands then a 
strategic retreat is necessary. PL Lindseth, ‘Equilibrium, Demoi-cracy, and Delegation in the Crisis of European 
Integration’ (2014) 15 (4) German Law Journal 529, 533. 
16
 See contribution by Eckes in this volume. Eckes points out that the only legal bridge between CFSP and TFEU is in 
the field of sanctions (state and individual / smart). 
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 Ibid. Preamble 11. 
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The CFSP undertone of EU energy activity under the TFEU becomes more transparent if we take 
into account the EU’s reliance on imported energy. Having said that, we cannot claim that the 
Regulation on security of gas supply creates the possibility of implied external competences in the 
field of energy security. It boosts, however, the presence of energy in the EU foreign policy terrain 
strengthened further by other TFEU aspects of external relations law. We shall note, for instance, 
that the export and import of energy products from and to third countries falls within the scope of 
EU Common Commercial Policy (CCP) which under Article 207 TFEU grants the EU the power to 
conclude tariff and trade agreements and adopt autonomous measures with regard to all aspects of 
CCP (goods, services, commercial aspects of IP). 18  What is more, energy-related aspects can 
become part of Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCA). These are individual international 
cooperation mechanisms predominantly occupied with establishing a free trade area. PCAs were 
originally concluded as mixed (cross-pillar) agreements between the EU, the Member States and the 
newly independent states that emerged after the fall of the Soviet Union.19 They are now concluded 
on the basis of Article 212 TFEU which provides that ‘the Union shall carry out economic, financial 
and technical cooperation measures, including assistance, in particular financial assistance, with 
third countries other than developing countries’.20 The EU-Russia PCA, which expired in 2007, is 
perhaps the most well-known one. Negotiations on a new EU-Russia Agreement were suspended in 
2014 due to, inter alia, the negative interdependency with Russia and Russia’s annexation of 
Crimea.21  
 
With reference to CFSP under the TEU, which is strictly separated from CCP within the TFEU 
framework, energy security has for a while been a marginal competence and until recently rarely 
evoked by the EU’s High Representative or the External Action Service22. This has now changed 
with the growing externalisation of the EU’s internal targets which means that the EU can now 
                                                 
18
 See S Haghighi, Energy Security: The External Legal Relations of the EU with Major Oil and Gas Supplying 
Countries (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007) p.112. 
19
 Borrowing from C Hillion, G De Baere calls these agreements ‘proto cross-pillar’ because at the time PCAs were 
concluded, the EU did not have legal personality to enter into treaties (they were concluded on behalf of the EC). Yet 
again PCAs provided a model for bridging cross-pillar objectives such as promoting trade and combating crime. Post-
Lisbon, cross-pillar mixed agreements declined because all international agreements are now signed by the EU. Still, 
however, a certain fuzziness is maintained in lieu of the retention of CFSP in the TEU and thus its firm separation from 
the rest of the TFEU policy areas. See G De Baere, Constitutional Principles of EU External Relations (Oxford 
University Press, 2008), p. 297. 
20
 See for an extensive study of PCAs: C Hillion, The Evolving System of EU External Relations as Evidenced in the EU 
Partnerships with Russia and Ukraine (Ph.D thesis, Leiden, 2005). 
21
 For more information on the state of EU-Russia relationship see: House of Lords, European Union Committee, ‘The 
EU and Russia: Before and Beyond the Crisis in Ukraine’, February 2015, 
https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201415/ldselect/ldeucom/115/115.pdf  
22
 B Van Vooren (2012), Europe unplugged: progress, potential and limitations of EU external energy policiy three 
years post-Lisbon, Sieps working paper  
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adopt autonomous instruments in the field of energy security (under Article 194 TFEU) as well as 
conclude international agreements (e.g. bilateral agreements with third countries) to this end. 
International agreements can be conducted through the EU classic range of instruments via Article 
24 TEU (EU competence in matters of CFSP) and Article 37 TEU (conclusion of agreements with 
one or more states). Yet, Article 37 TEU states that the EU may only conclude international 
agreements in areas covered by the Treaty’s CFSP Chapter. As such this enabling provision has to 
be read in the light of both Article 23 TEU (EU action on international scene) and Article 24 TEU 
(CFSP competence). Article 23 TEU, for instance, states that CFSP action shall be guided by the 
principles in Article 3 TEU (promotion of EU values), and the objectives inherent in Article 21 
TEU (democracy, rule of law, human rights). Yet, none of these values or objectives mentions 
‘energy security’. As such, Article 194 (1) (b) TFEU (security of energy supply in the Union) has to 
be brought in as it provides the EU’s ‘energy’ canvas for any action at the EU level – whether 
internal or external.   
 
Aside the aforementioned CFSP legal bases, international agreements can benefit from the CJEU’s 
established case law which provides that even if an express ‘energy security’ competence is not 
granted to the EU as such, it can still make use of its implied external powers under Article 216 (1) 
TFEU.23 Like Article 194 TFEU, Article 216 (1) TFEU was also introduced by the Lisbon Treaty in 
a shorthand attempt to codify the CJEU’s voluminous case law on the EU’s external implied powers. 
In summary, Article 216 (1) TFEU constitutes a residual competence under which the EU may 
conclude an international agreement with one or more third countries or international organisations 
in the following three situations: i) where the Treaties so provide, ii) where the conclusion of an 
agreement is necessary in order to achieve, within the framework of the EU’s policies, one of the 
objectives referred to in the Treaties (also known as the principle of necessity), and iii) [where the 
conclusion of an agreement] is provided for in a legally binding EU act or is likely to affect 
common rules or alter their scope.  
 
The analysis of the CJEU’s case law on implied powers has been thorough elsewhere.24 Suffice to 
say here that the EU has competence to act autonomously and advance its external energy policy. 
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 The Treaty only provides for express provisions regarding the EU’s legal personality (Article 47 TEU), the capacity 
to negotiate agreements with third countries or international organisations (Article 218 TFEU) and the possibility to 
pursue common policies and actions to safeguard EU values, fundamental interests, security, independence and integrity 
(Article 21 (a) TEU). 
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 T Konstadinides ‘EU Foreign Policy under the Doctrine of Implied Powers: Codification Drawbacks and 
Constitutional Limitations’ (2014) 39 (4) European Law Review 511. 
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The above implied competence aside, Article 194 (2) TFEU will provide a platform for the adoption 
of intra-EU specific measures that would, nonetheless, regulate the conditions for exploitation of 
the Member States energy resources when they act in the foreign domain.25 So far, the CJEU has 
been effective in managing mixity by pointing Member States to the duty of sincere cooperation 
enshrined in Article 4 (3) TEU and the requirement of unity in the EU’s international 
representation. At another level, it has recognised mixity as a means of safeguarding national 
competences in the absence of implied pre-emption emanating from EU external action.26 Hence, 
albeit the EU external energy policy has not been an evident step at the beginning of the process, it 
is now taking a certain shape. Two factors have been crucial in this development: first, the 
securitisation of the CFSP framework and second, the externalisation of the EU’s internal market 
policies. We will hereafter consider each of those factors in turn. 
  
3. The Securitisation of CFSP 
 
Energy constitutes a key area for EU external relations policy and has been as much a source of 
cooperation as well as conflict. The external reliance of the EU to its energy needs has inevitably 
created a linkage between EU foreign policy and energy policy and, therefore, an interest to deploy 
external instruments in order to address energy security issues. Having said that, energy security can 
be supported by different external instruments and policies ranging from CFSP to development 
policy. Such instruments can be added to the economic initiatives and measures discussed later in 
the Chapter since energy security involves inter alia the security of supply and demand, as well as 
the reliability of contractual arrangements on energy and the interplay between national and 
supranational energy policies.  
 
Almost ten years ago, in his capacity as High Representative for the CFSP, Javier Solana 
highlighted the importance of CFSP in establishing a ‘united policy on energy questions’. 27 
Likewise, in its Green Paper of March 2006, while recognising the importance of the realisation of 
its internal energy marker, the Commission stressed that ‘Member States should promote the 
principles of the internal energy market in bilateral and multilateral fora, enhancing the Union’s 
                                                 
25
 See K Haraldsdóttir, ‘The Limits of EU Competence to Regulate Conditions for Exploitation of Energy Resources: 
Analysis of Article 194(2) TFEU’ (2014) 23 (6) European Energy and Environmental Law Review 208. 
26
 See T Konstadinides, ‘In the Union of Wine: Loose Ends in the Relationship between the European Union and the 
Member States in the field of External Representation’ (2015) 21 (4) European Public Law 679. 
27
 J Solana, Energy in the Common Foreign and Security Policy in G Austin et al. (eds.) Energy Conflict Prevention, 
(Brussels: Madariaga European Foundation, 2007). 
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coherence and weight externally on energy issues.’28 Last but not least, the 2008 European Security 
Strategy, which provides the CFSP’s conceptual framework, emphasised that given the EU’s energy 
dependence increase (which was predicted to reach 75% by 2030) ‘our response must be an EU 
energy policy which combines external and internal dimensions.’29 The above milestones serve to 
illustrate that, already prior to the Treaty of Lisbon, the focus was on a coherent approach to 
ensuring energy security as a part of the CFSP.  
 
While post-Lisbon energy has gained more visibility in the Treaty, there are two main challenges 
with reference to CFSP ‘energy’ competence. The first relates to the question of how to combine 
the CFSP legal basis, the new energy legal basis, and the Treaty’s Article 40 TEU non-affectation 
clause as the legal foundation for both internal and external energy security instruments. Indeed, a 
challenge posed by the Lisbon Treaty on the use of implied powers is related to the choice of legal 
basis for cross-sectoral international agreements involving multiple objectives such as CFSP and 
energy.  In this case, a dual legal basis, namely Article 194 TFEU and Articles 24 TEU and 37 TEU 
or Article 216 (1) TFEU (in case external action on energy is implied) may be the way forward to 
sign energy agreements (viz. gas transits; interdependence) since Article 40 TEU excludes that 
external competence can be implied for external energy measures under Article 194 TFEU alone. 
Nonetheless, international agreements would have to be carefully worded in order to avoid potential 
annulment actions against the secondary legislative provision (e.g. a Council Decision) which gives 
them effect. Such annulment may arise, for instance, due to encroachment by the general exercise of 
EU power on the CFSP.30 This is all the more important because the drafting of Article 216 (1) 
TFEU hints that the provision may be employed to pursue equally CFSP as much as non-CFSP 
objectives. As such, the mutual non-affectation clause of Article 40 TEU has to be used prudently 
by the CJEU as a means of ring-fencing any potential expansion of the scope of EU implied powers 
under Article 216 (1) TFEU by the EU legislature.31  
                                                 
28
 European Commission Communication to the European Council, ‘External energy relations – from principles to 
action’, 12.10.2006, COM (2006) 590 final. 
29
 European Council, ‘Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy - Providing Security in a 
Changing World’ Brussels, 11 December 2008 S407/08.  
30
 See Case C-91/05 Commission v Council (ECOWAS) [2008] ECR I-3651. CJEU annulled the contested Council 
Decision. It held that under former Article 47 TEU, the EU could not have recourse to a legal basis falling within the 
CFSP in order to adopt provisions which also fall within a competence conferred by the former EC Treaty on the 
Community. Current Article 40 TEU, however, does not provide for such one-sided protection of the TFEU from 
possible encroachment by the CFSP. 
31
 Article 40 TEU provides: The implementation of the CFSP shall not affect the application of the procedures and the 
extent of the powers of the institutions laid down by the Treaties for the exercise of the Union competences referred to 
in Articles 3 to 6 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Similarly, the implementation of the policies 
listed in those Articles shall not affect the application of the procedures and the extent of the powers of the institutions 
laid down by the Treaties for the exercise of the Union competences under this Chapter. 31 See in this regard A. 
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The second challenge to CFSP ‘energy’ competence relates to the caveat in Article 194 (2) TFEU 
on Member States’ right to determine the conditions for exploiting their energy resources. This is 
crucial especially when it comes to energy security. Energy security constitutes one of the key aims 
of EU energy policy according to Article 194 (1) (b) TFEU. It is commonly meant to entail the 
EU’s capacity to secure access to energy supplies in order to correspond to the energy needs of its 
Member States. According to neorealist thought, however, energy resources constitute power 
components of national foreign policy often utilised by states to exert their external influence upon 
their counterparts.32 Such a reading of energy security is crucial for the future CFSP involvement in 
the field. 
 
The above argument aside, there are certain positive developments. The 2014 Energy Union 
Initiative emphasised the EU’s ability to act more harmoniously in negotiations with third countries. 
It outlines, in particular, the need to strengthen the role of the Commission in intergovernmental 
agreements in order to ensure that such agreements are in compliance with EU Law.33 Hence the 
package outlines the intention of the Commission to review the 2012 Intergovernmental 
Agreements Decision (994/2012/EU) that established an information exchange mechanism with 
respect to energy agreements between Member States and third countries.34 This Decision provided 
that Member States should submit to the Commission all the intergovernmental agreements they 
have concluded within the meaning of Article 25 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 
The review of the Decision will focus on ensuring that the Commission has the power to inter alia 
ensure agreements are compatible with EU legislation before negotiations are concluded and 
securing the involvement of the Commission in such negotiations. It is important to note that in its 
statement on subsidiarity in the proposal for a new Intergovernmental Agreements Decision, the 
Commission has acknowledged that ‘the Decision stands at the cross-roads of the external 
dimension (as it involves agreements with third countries) and of the internal market (as non-
compliant provisions such as destination clauses have a negative impact on the free flow of energy 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Dashwood “Article 47 and the Relationship between First and Second Pillar Competences” in A. Dashwood and M. 
Maresceau (eds), Law and Practice of EU External Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008) p.99; P. 
Eeckhout, “The EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy after Lisbon: From Pillar Talk to Constitutionalism” in A. 
Biondi and P. Eeckhout (eds), EU After Lisbon (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), p.272. 
32
 See T Dyson, Neoclassical Realism and Defence Reform in Post-Cold War Europe (Palgrave Macmillan, 2010). 
33
 Communication from the Commission: A Framework Strategy for a Resilient Energy Union with a Forward-Looking 
Climate Change Policy COM/2015/080 final. 
34
 The Commission produced a proposal to that effect on 16 February 2016. See Proposal for a Decision on establishing 
an information exchange mechanism with regard to intergovernmental agreements and non-binding instruments 
between Member States and third countries in the field of energy and repealing Decision No 994/2012/EU 
COM/2016/053 final. 
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products within the internal market).’35 The Commission has therefore identified ‘a clear added 
value to reinforce the cooperation and transparency at EU level in the framework of this proposal.’36 
 
4. The CFSP dimension of market liberalisation  
 
Any limitations posed by the CFSP framework can be addressed by the externalisation of the EU’s 
market ‘constitution’. In this regard we may confidently refer to a CFSP dimension of market 
liberalisation. The externalisation of internal market policies is evident in the introduction of the so-
called ‘Third Party Clause’, otherwise known as the ‘Gazprom clause’ provided in the Third Energy 
Package.37 Under this provision, a Transmission System Operator (TSO) controlled by a third-
country supplier that wishes to perform its functions on the territory of a Member State must receive 
certification prior to its establishment in the EU. The certification procedure aims to satisfy that the 
TSO complies with the unbundling requirements of the Third Package.38 Unbundling is a market 
liberalisation tool and refers to the process of separation of energy supply and generation from the 
operation of transmission networks. This is seen as an appropriate mechanism to remove the 
conflict of interest that may arise if a single company operates a transmission network and generates 
or sells energy at the same time.39 In such a scenario, the vertically integrated company may have 
an incentive to obstruct competitors’ access to infrastructure, preventing competition in the market 
and leading to consumer detriment in the form of higher prices. Under the Third Package 
unbundling must take place in one of the three following ways: Ownership Unbundling (OU), 
where all integrated energy companies sell off their gas and electricity network; Independent 
System Operator (ISO), where energy supply companies may still formally own gas or electricity 
transmission networks, but must leave the entire operation to an independent company; and 
Independent Transmission Operator (ITO), where energy supply companies may still formally own 
gas or electricity transmission networks but must leave the entire operation and investment in the 
grid to an independent company.  
 
                                                 
35
 Decision of the European Parliament and the Council on establishing an information exchange mechanism with 
regard to intergovernmental agreements and non-binding instruments between Member States and third countries in the 
field of energy and repealing Decision No 994/2012/EU, COM (2016) 53 final. 
36
 Ibid, See Subsidiarity heading. 
37
 Electricity Directive 2009 (n 7), article 11. See further Recital 22, Electricity Directive 2009 and Recital 25 Gas 
Directive 2009. 
38
 See Electricity Directive 2009 (n 7) and Gas Directive 2009 (n 7), articles 9-23 regarding ownership unbundling of 
production, supply and network assets within the controlling undertaking. 
39
 See Electricity Directive 2009 (n 7),  Recital 11.  
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Under the Third Party Clause, when a third country entity seeks certification as a Transmission 
System Operator (TSO), Article 11 in each Directive requires a detailed assessment by the National 
Regulatory Authority (NRA) to ensure that the unbundling obligations are met and that security of 
energy supply of the Member State and the EU will not be put at risk. The burden of proof lies with 
the respective TSO. A prior Commission opinion must be sought before certification and the NRA 
must take ‘utmost account’ of that opinion when adopting its final decision. Each Member State 
retains the ultimate power of veto when its security is at stake. All in all, the purpose of this 
political, one may argue, provision is to ensure that EU interests will be secured and to avoid 
situations where an external, non-EU (vertically integrated) undertaking has control over EU 
networks.40  
 
Security of supply is closely interrelated and dependent upon the effective functioning of the 
internal market and the greater integration of Member State’s markets. In parallel with the 
provisions of sector-specific regulation relating to unbundling and third party access, the application 
of EU competition law also plays an important, complementary role in safeguarding and promoting 
security of supply. EU competition law is found in Articles 101 TFEU, with prohibits agreements 
between undertakings, which may affect trade between Member States and distort competition in 
the internal market and 102 TFEU, which prohibits the abuse of a dominant position by an 
undertaking within the internal market or in a substantial part of it. The EU Merger Regulation (EC) 
No. 139/2004 is also powerful tool.41  
 
As will be shown, competition law has attained a disciplinary function in allegations involving 
activities performed by third-country gas undertakings on the EU territory. As the European 
Commission has repeatedly stated, trade relationships with foreign energy suppliers have to abide 
with EU Competition law rules.42 EU’s jurisdiction in such cases derives from the territoriality 
principle under public international law. According to the territoriality principle, EU may exercise 
its executive and judicial jurisdiction over violations committed on its territory, irrespective of the 
                                                 
40
 For an analysis of the origins of the Third Party Clause see Monica Waloszyk, Law and Policy of the European Gas 
Market (EE 2014) 69-73. For the relationship between the Third Party Clause and the European Charter Treaty see K 
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41
 Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (the 
EC Merger Regulation) [2004] OJ L 24/1. 
42
 GFU, Case COMP/36.072; Territorial restrictions 1) Algeria gas transport contracts, 2) Expansion of TAG pipeline, 
Case COMP/37.811; Territorial restrictions – Austria (Gazprom/OMV), Case COMP/38.085; Territorial restrictions in 
Germany (Ruhrgas/Gazprom), Case COMP/38.307. See further M. Lindroos, D. Schnichels and L.P. Svane, 
‘Liberalisation of European Gas Markets - Commission settles GFU case with Norwegian gas producers’ (October 
2002) 3 Competition Policy Newsletter 50 available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/cpn/2002_3_50.pdf 
(last accessed 27 January 2016). 
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nationality of the offender. Article 7 of Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003, the procedural framework 
governing EU competition law, states that ‘the Commission, when finding that there is an 
infringement of [Articles 101 and 102 TFEU], may impose on the relevant undertakings any 
behavioural or structural remedies which are proportionate to the infringement committed and 
necessary to bring the infringement effectively to an end’.43  
 
Hence, the Commission has repeatedly examined under Article 101 TFEU trade agreements 
concluded between EU-based undertakings and large external producers and suppliers of gas, such 
as Gazprom (Russia) and Sonatrach (Algeria). Such vertical agreements, typically referred to as 
long-term energy contracts, are a pervasive feature of the European energy sector. For a long time, 
they were considered as the cornerstone of security of supply in European countries. This is because 
they allowed the EU buyers, typically the national energy monopolies, to secure energy supply and 
the external suppliers to secure energy demand that was necessary financing for developing 
infrastructure. Following the liberalisation of the energy markets, however, long-term energy 
contracts came under scrutiny by the European Commission. Because long-term energy contracts 
typically tie a large percentage of market demand, they may result in upstream market foreclosure 
and violate competition law rules, particularly when the supplier has market power.44 Furthermore, 
such agreements typically contain a number of clauses, which may be anticompetitive in nature; 
such as territorial sales restrictions, profit-splitting mechanisms, long-term exclusive purchase 
obligations and use restrictions. Most crucially, such clauses may indirectly undermine the 
objectives of security of supply and diversification of gas supplies by impeding the entry of new 
market players, as the Energy Sector Inquiry revealed. 45  
 
Hence, in 2003, the Commission negotiated the removal of territorial restriction clauses from the 
agreements between Gazprom and some of its EU trading partners such as ENI (Italy)46, OMV 
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 Council Regulation (EC) 1/2003 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of 
the Treaty [2013] OJ L 1. 
44
 For an analysis see K Talus, ‘Long-term natural gas contracts and antitrust law in the European Union and the United 
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agreements and security of supply-between law and politics’ (2007) 4 European Law Review 535. 
45
 Inquiry pursuant to Article 17 of Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003 into the European gas and electricity sectors (Final 
Report) (COM/2006/851 final) 10 January 2007.  
46
 Commission Press Release, ‘Commission reaches breakthrough with Gazprom an ENI on territorial restriction 
clauses’ IP/03/1345, 6.10.2003. 
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(Austria) 47  and E.ON Ruhrgas (Germany). 48  Such clauses, otherwise known as ‘destination 
clauses’, prevent the buyer from reselling the gas outside a certain geographic area thus 
undermining the creation of a pan-European energy market. For example, ENI was prevented from 
selling gas bought from Gazprom outside of Italy and Gazprom could not sell gas to other Italian 
customers without ENI’s consent. Furthermore, the Commission has successfully negotiated the 
removal of other anticompetitive clauses such as use restrictions, included in agreements with the 
Norwegian companies Statoil and Norsk Hydro49 as well as profit sharing mechanisms50 included in 
agreements with the Algerian company Sonatrach.51 In the latter case, negotiations between the 
European Commission and the Algerian government lasted over 7 years and Sonatrach undertook 
inter alia to delete territorial restriction clauses from all existing contracts and not to insert such 
clauses in any future contracts nor to employ profit sharing clauses in any existing or future gas 
supply contract. Similarly, in December 2002, the Commission ended its investigation of sales by 
Nigerian gas company NLNG into the EU following the latter’s agreement to release one of its 
European customers from a clause preventing the customer from selling outside of it national 
borders.52 NLNG further undertook not to introduce territorial restrictions clauses, use restrictions 
or profit splitting mechanisms in future contracts. The only cases to close with a formal decision 
were the GDF/ENEL and GDF/ENI cases.53 
 
Most recently, Article 102 TFEU has also played an important role in disciplining the behaviour of 
foreign undertakings so as to promote inter alia energy security in the EU gas market. 54  In 
September 2012, the European Commission opened a formal investigation of Gazprom’s business 
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 Commission Press Release, ‘Competition: Commission secures improvements to gas supply contracts between OMV 
and Gazprom’ IP/05/195, 17.2.2005. 17 February 2005. 
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practices in the EU.55 Gazprom is one of the EU’s largest gas suppliers and the dominant natural gas 
supplier in all Central and Eastern European countries. As such, its role in ensuring security of 
supply in the EU is essential. The Commission alleges that some of its business practices in Central 
and Eastern gas markets constitute an abuse of its dominant position in breach of Article 102 TFEU. 
In particular, the Commission accuses Gazprom of pursuing an overall strategy to partition Central 
and Eastern gas markers by imposing territorial restrictions in its supply agreements with gas 
wholesalers and with some industrial customers. These territorial restrictions include export ban 
clauses, destination clauses and other measures preventing the cross-border flow of gas. As a result 
of this market partitioning, Gazprom may have been able to charge unfair prices in five eastern EU 
member states ‘by charging prices to wholesalers that are significantly higher compared to 
Gazprom’s costs or to benchmark prices’.56  
 
According to the Commission’s preliminary findings, Gazprom may be leveraging its dominant 
market position by making the supply of gas to Bulgaria and Poland dependent on obtaining 
unrelated commitments from wholesalers concerning gas transport infrastructure. For example, gas 
supplies were made dependent on investments in a pipeline project promoted by Gazprom or 
accepting Gazprom reinforcing its control over a pipeline. Such behaviour, if confirmed, impedes 
the cross-border sale of gas within the Single Market thus lowering the liquidity and efficiency of 
gas markets. It raises artificial barriers to trade between Member States and results in higher gas 
prices. Should it be confirmed that Gazprom has abused its dominant position, the Commission may 
impose a fine of 10 per cent of the undertaking’s total turnover, order interim measures or accept a 
commitment to terminate anticompetitive behaviour.57  
 
Furthermore, merger control has also emerged as a powerful tool in promoting energy security. 
Under article 2(3) of the Merger Regulation, the Commission is entitled to declare a concentration 
that causes significant impediments to effective competition incompatible with the internal market, 
particularly if it concerns the strengthening of a dominant position in the market. A recent case 
concerns the proposed acquisition of the only Greek gas transmission system operator DESFA by 
SOCAR, the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan Republic is pending approval by the European 
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Commission since January 2015.58 According to the Commission, there is preliminary evidence that 
the proposed merged entity ‘may have the ability and the incentive to hinder competitive upstream 
gas suppliers from accessing the Greek transmission system, in order to reduce competition on the 
upstream wholesale gas market in Greece. This could reduce the number of current and potential 
suppliers and the amount of natural gas in Greece and lead to higher gas prices for clients’.59 
 
Finally, it is also possible that activities conducted by foreign undertakings in the energy sector, 
through for example international mergers amongst incumbents, may have an impact upon 
competition within the EU territory, even if no Member State or its territory is involved. In such 
cases, a question arises as to whether the EU competition law rules could apply extraterritorially 
against an undertaking in another country, where the latter behaves in an anticompetitive manner 
having adverse effects on the EU territory (‘effects doctrine’).60 So far, the CJEU has not ruled 
specifically on whether there is an ‘effects doctrine’ under EU law, since it has been possible under 
Articles 101 TFEU and 102 TFEU to extend the territorial jurisdiction of EU competition law based 
on the ‘single economic entity doctrine’ or the ‘implementation doctrine’. According to the former, 
parents and subsidiaries are considered to form the same undertaking for the purposes of applying 
competition law rules so the parent can be held responsible for the unlawful conduct of the 
subsidiary.61 According to the latter, the EU may assert jurisdiction over foreign undertakings in 
relation to their foreign conduct if that conduct was implemented in the EU.62  
 
In its recent judgment in Intel63 the General Court ruled that the jurisdiction of the EU is justified 
under public international law either by the implementation doctrine or by the ‘qualified effects’ 
doctrine, that is to say, the criteria of ‘immediate, substantial and immediate effects’.64 The latter 
has been invoked in the context of mergers outside the EU and the most important pronouncement 
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was given in the Gencor v Commission case.65 The extraterritorial application of competition law in 
that case prevented the merger between two South African mining companies, which would have 
left them with 30-35% of world production. On appeal, the General Court found the application of 
the EU Merger Regulation justified under public international law ‘when it was foreseeable that the 
proposed merger would have ‘an immediate and substantial effect in the Community’.66  
 
Conclusion 
 
The chapter looked into the energy policy and CFSP nexus. It provided an overview of the 
historical development of the EU’s competence in energy policy. It then shifted to look at the 
externalisation of EU energy policy and its future potential. Two EU responses, in particular, have 
raised issues about the future design of energy policy as a part of CFSP. These responses are firmly 
related to EU aspirations for more actorness, cohesiveness and effectiveness in dealing with 
geopolitical developments and threats in the realm of foreign and security policy. The first response 
concerns EU’s effort to ‘securitise’ EU energy policy and law. Through a number of initiatives 
related to energy security, the EU has succeeded in widening the conceptual scope of EU external 
action objectives to include energy. The second response pertains to the increased EU emphasis on 
the CFSP dimension of market liberalisation which seems to have compensated for the lack of a 
CFSP legal basis in the field of energy.  
 
Both the securitisation of EU energy policy and law and the CFSP dimension of the internal market 
have helped built rules and procedures and have established a legal platform for comprehensive 
approach to external action in the field of energy. For instance, The EU’s third energy package and 
its Gazprom clause constitute examples where not only does the EU confirm its presence as a global 
economic actor but also emerges as a disciplinarian in the field of external relations. The 
disciplinary influence of the restrictive measures adopted under the TEU against third countries 
such as Russia or Iran in conjunction with competition rules under the TFEU are bound to impact 
upon current and future EU energy partnerships. The legal challenges ahead are of course 
numerous. From a policy standpoint, action in the field of energy via resort to CFSP instruments or 
competition law may not be easily distinguished. From a legal perspective, however, we have to 
deal with the perennial issue of legal competence which has occupied much of the scholarship on 
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the law of EU external relations. The nuance between TFEU and TEU in the field of energy takes 
place in an environment where EU competence is not clear-cut and perhaps it is bound to remain 
uncertain due to the Member States’ desire for mixity in CFSP and the deeply politicised (and 
intergovernmental) context within which CFSP rules are applied. The same is true about the 
commitments for neighbouring states under the Energy Community Treaty. By way of conclusion, 
it is argued, therefore, that energy action under the TFEU, including the CJEU’s jurisdiction, cannot 
achieve CFSP objectives single-handedly. By contrast, an energy legal basis in the TEU recognising 
energy policy as part of the CFSP acquis would be desirable. Such an innovation would add legal 
certainty in the implementation of a comprehensive approach to EU external action in the field of 
energy and, in particular, for the future CFSP legal framework at large. 
 
